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Administrative Agencies 
by Garrett Elmore* 
The past year has seen a cross section of administrative 
law at work. If there is any discernible trend, it is that both 
the California courts and the California legislature seem 
keenly aware of the problems of balance that are involved 
in agency procedures and in the judicial review of an agency's 
act or decision. It may be speculated that in such balancing, 
continued attention will be given to such matters as prehearing 
discovery and conferences, the adequacy of findings of fact 
in particular situations, and the relationship between admin-
istrative remedies and court determinations. 
This article will consider the year's developments, primarily 
court decisions, in the following order: prehearing investiga-
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tions and procedures, formal charge, defenses, hearing proce-
dures, adminstrative findings, and the relationship between 
agency decisions and the courts. By reason of the varied 
statutes and local laws governing particular administrative 
proceedings, it is not feasible to portray each case in its 
particular setting in detail. Rather, the purpose of this review 
is to present the year's decisions or other developments in 
a highlight fashion. 
Prehearing Investigations and Procedures 
Of outstanding significance this past year was the unani-
mous decision of the California Supreme Court in Shively v. 
Stewart/ according, for the first time in California, a right 
of prehearing discovery to a respondent charged with a 
disciplinary offense in a proceeding under the California 
Administrative Procedure Act. Indeed, the implications of 
Shively extend beyond proceedings under the Act.2 Shively 
applied common-law rules to permit and regulate the use 
of the agency's subpoena power to secure prehearing discovery 
by a respondent. Principally, it applied the analogy of 
criminal-law discovery, though also using certain civil dis-
covery techniques in matters of detail.3 
Under Shively, a respondent now has a means of compel-
ling prehearing production of witness' statements and other 
writings held by the agency. It is clear that the items need 
not be admissible in evidence to compel their production, 
but discovery standards apply. Conversely, as in the case 
of discovery in criminal cases, there must be a showing of 
more than a mere wish for the benefit of all the information 
in the adversary's files. Principally, this question will arise 
1. 65 Cal.2d 475, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 
421 P.2d 65 (1966). 
2. See, e.g., Endler v. Schutzbank, 
68 Cal.2d 160, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 436 
P .2d 297 (1968) (referring to Shively 
for the conduct of a nonstatutory hear-
ing). 
3. Civil discovery techniques include 
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum 
318 CAL LAW 1967 
upon affidavit (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 1985), use of depositions, though not 
for the broad purposes provided by the 
California Civil Discovery Act (Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2016-2036), and the 
application of "good cause" and attor-
ney's work product standards (Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc. § 2016(b), § 2036(a», 
in the case of broad demands for reports 
gathered for the agency. 
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upon a call, as in Shively, for all reports and documents gath-
ered by investigators and employees of the agency. Shively 
held that this type of call was too broad, but that respondent 
might make an additional showing of need and specificity 
and obtain documents that are neither privileged nor pro-
tected as the attorney's work product. To obtain information 
necessary to make such a showing, the respondent was given 
the right to take depositions of the agency's attorney and 
executive secretary. 
In brief, the legal procedure outlined in Shively contem-
plates that the respondent is entitled as a matter of course 
to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, by the agency or 
assigned hearing officer, upon filing the affidavit provided for 
by Code of Civil Procedure section 1985; the agency can 
move to quash, vacate, or modify the subpoena in the superior 
court; and the respondent may take depositions as mentioned 
above. In respect to the agency's cross right of prehearing 
discovery, it was noted that the agency had sufficient resources 
and legal means to enable it to secure complete information 
and prepare its case before filing the accusation. 
At this time, as indicated by the legislature's pre-existing 
interest in the subject and the introduction of three types of 
bills in 1967,4 there is some basis to believe that legislative 
action may be forthcoming in this area. But it is doubtful 
that the legislation will depart radically from the simple 
approach of Shively, which obviously is capable of applica-
tion in other administrative proceedings. 
4. See Assembly Bill 24 (1965); 
Assembly Bills 572, 925 and 926 (1967); 
Senate Bills 942 and 1359 (1967); 
Senate Resolution 388 (1967). In 1965 
Assembly Bill 25, a broad bill adapted 
from the California Civil Discovery 
Act, passed one house. In 1967 (after 
Shively) narrower bills were introduced. 
One form, drafted by a State Bar com-
mittee, was based upon modified civil 
discovery before a hearing officer but 
with superior court review (Assembly 
Bill 572 and Senate Bill 942). A 
second form provided for bilateral in-
spection of writings and written claims 
of privilege, with court review only 
upon review of final decision in the 
case (Senate Bill 1359). The third form 
(as amended) provided for bilateral in-
spection of writings and the right to 
take depositions, under limitations, and 
subject to hearing-officer rulings (As-
sembly Bills 925, 926). It received the 
most favorable consideration, but went 
to interim study. 
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Also of substantial importance in the area of prehearing 
discovery is an amendment to the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, effective July 4, 1967. As a public records 
measure, it permits "any person" to inspect all agency records 
except those in nine listed categories, two of which are similar 
to that matter which under California law is protected by 
privilege and work product exceptions.5 
In the area of the agency's own investigative powers, two 
cases may be noted. People v. King6 illustrates the problems 
that may be encountered when the statutory authority for 
an administrative subpoena also provides for immunity from 
criminal prosecution by reason of compelled testimony or 
compelled production of records. King holds that the giving 
of compelled testimony under such a statute confers the 
immunity. There is no need to claim privilege against self-
incrimination if the statute does not so require. King implies, 
without directly holding, that under such a statute the witness 
can be compelled to produce corporate records pursuant to 
the administrative subpoena, without giving rise to immunity, 
so long as he is not compelled to testify. 
The second case, Miley v. Harper,7 involves the legal posi-
tion of the private citizen who fails in an action in which he 
has instituted a complaint against a licensee. The question 
is important, since it is only through the cooperation of pri-
vate citizens that many regulatory laws can be effectively 
administered. As to administrative proceedings generally, 
the substantive law of this state was declared in the 1957 
case of Hardy v. Vial. s Hardy imposes liability on the private 
citizen for malicious prosecution in accord with the rule of 
section 680 of Restatement (First) of Torts. In Miley, the 
agency accusation had previously been decided in favor of the 
respondent-licensee, and the complainant was made the de-
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552. See H.R. Rep. No. 
1497, 89th Congo 2d sess. (1966); U.S. 
Code Congo & Ad. News 2418. 
6. 66 Ca1.2d 633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 571, 
427 P.2d 171 (1967). 
7. 248 Cal. App.2d 463, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 536 (1967). 
320 CAL LAW 1967 
8. 48 Cal.2d 577, 311 P.2d 494, 66 
A.L.R.2d 739 (1957); see also Werner V. 
Hearst Publications, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 
2d 667, 151 P.2d 308 (1944); Restate-
ment (First) of Torts, Comment g, § 653. 
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fendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution. A mo-
tion for summary judgment for the defendant was granted by 
the trial court, largely on the basis of a supporting declaration 
of the agency's attorney, which indicated that the agency itself 
had made the decision to file the accusation, based on its own 
investigation. On appeal, the ruling was reversed for failure 
to show facts sufficient to establish a finding of "independent 
investigation" and independent causation. The decision indi-
cates that had the agency's full investigative report been part 
of the record, it could have supported the motion as admissible 
hearsay and sufficient facts might then have been presented 
for summary judgment. It would seem, therefore, that con-
siderable importance attaches to the agency investigation of 
complaints and to the adequacy of the agency's records 
thereof. 
Finally, in the area of prehearing procedures, a 1967 legis-
lative measure, if passed, would have provided for a pre-
accusation conference between representatives of the poten-
tial respondent and the agency.9 Its purpose was to facilitate 
possible agreed dispositions, including a disposition by pay-
ment of a stipulated fine, within defined statutory limits, and 
thereby avoid formal charges and later proceedings. Al-
though the measure was vetoed, a version of the same bill 
may be expected to be introduced at a future session of the 
legislature. 
Formal Charge 
In Wisuri v. Newark School Distriet,l° the familiar rule was 
restated that notice of charges need not meet the formal re-
quirements of a complaint in a civil action. But frequently 
this rule leads to difficulties, of which Sarae v. State Board 
of Edueationll is an illustrative case, in that problems may 
be encountered in the use of conclusionary and evidentiary 
allegations in the accusation, including alleged admissions of 
the respondent. Little or no decisional law exists on this 
9. Senate Bill 366 (1967). 
10. 247 Cal. App.2d 239, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 490 (1966). 
21 
11. 249 Cal. App.2d 58, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 69 (1967). 
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form of notice, which is sometimes used by draftsmen. For 
example, the accusation may allege specific misconduct or 
acts and also allege surrounding circumstances, such as the 
respondent's arrest, the criminal charges or the outcome there-
of, and alleged admissions of other acts of misconduct made 
to the arresting officer. In form, this type of accusation goes 
beyond the California Administrative Procedure Act, which 
provides that the accusation shall set forth in ordinary and 
concise language the acts or omissions with which the respond-
ent is charged.12 Such additional and evidentiary allegations 
place the respondent on notice of what the accuser claims. 
But they may also have the undesirable effect of framing 
irrelevant issues and of alleging admissions which perhaps 
cannot be legally established. 
Sarac involved an accusation in which additional circum-
stances were alleged. Unfortunately, the allegations were 
at least technically incorrect in alleging that respondent had 
pleaded guilty in a criminal case. Instead, he had pleaded 
nolo contendere under Penal Code section 1016 (3), which 
expressly states that such plea shall not be used as an admis-
sion against the defendant in a civil suit. The alleged plea 
of guilty was carried into the findings. On appeal, the licensee 
contended that such plea had prejudiced the trier of fact 
in a case where the principal evidence was in sharp conflict. 
He also objected to use of his alleged admissions of prior 
misconduct at the time of arrest. The appellate court decided 
neither the propriety of the accusation form nor the effect of 
the respondent's alleged admissions, but affirmed the court 
below on the limited ground that proof of the act of mis-
conduct specifically alleged was sufficient. 
The interesting point, not decided in Sarac, is whether a 
nolo contendere plea or the conviction based thereon may be 
equated with a guilty plea and treated as an admission for 
purposes of an administrative proceeding. Arguments may 
be made, pro and con. IS When the plea is made under Penal 
Code section 1016 (3), an administrative proceeding appears 
12. Cal. Government Code § 11503. -Its Use and Effect, 52 CA):,. L. REV. 
13. See comment, Nolo Contendere 408 (1964). 
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to be within the spirit, though not the literal terms, of the 
restraint applicable to its use as an admission in a civil suit. 
But even if the plea cannot be used as an admission, it and 
the criminal judgment, when arising out of the act or mis-
conduct charged, would appear to have some relevancy to the 
overall issues and, therefore, be admissible (when properly 
proved) under Evidence Code sections 210 and 351. But 
when received merely as "relevant evidence" the plea obvi-
ously would have much less weight than when received as an 
admission. 
Defenses 
Whether a county permit to operate a private patrol service 
can be summarily "revoked" by action of a county official, 
without prior notice of charges and opportunity to present 
defenses, was decided in Stewart v. County of San Mateo. 14 
In a decision exploring the limits of the procedural due proc-
ess rule that permits summary action where the public inter-
est is compelling, the court determined that a private patrol 
service has a sensitive relationship to the public safety. It 
upheld the "revocation," but as a temporary permit "suspen-
sion." A later full-scale hearing on specific charges by a 
review body, in this instance the board of supervisors, suffi-
ciently satisfied procedural due process. 
A similar question arose in Sokol v. Public Utilities Com-
mission,15 a case of first impression in California. Acting 
pursuant to a regulation of the state public utilities commis-
sion/6 a telephone company discontinued service to a sub-
scriber. It based its decision on a letter from a chief of 
police, who claimed that he had reasonable cause to believe 
the telephones were being used in an illegal activity. The 
regulation made such a letter sufficient, and no provision 
was made for advance notice to the subscriber. The exclu-
sive remedy of the subscriber was to file a complaint with the 
commission under general law. The service was in fact re-
14. 246 Cal. App.2d 273, 54 Cal. 15. 65 Cal.2d 247, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 599 (1966). For further discus- 673, 418 P.2d 265 (1966). 
sion of this case, see Leahy, Constitu- 16. 47 Cal. P.U.C. at 859-60. 
tional Law, in this volume. 
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stored upon complaint of the subscriber and pursuant to a 
commission proceeding, wherein it was found there was in-
sufficient evidence of use for illegal purposes. The Supreme 
Court, considering cases dealing with postponement of the 
right to hearing until after action had been taken, found there 
is no rule of general application in this situation. Recognizing 
the value of telephone communication to legitimate business 
and First Amendment rights, the court held the summary 
termination of telephone service deprived the subscriber of 
property without due process of law. Looking to other juris-
dictions for some guidelines, and finding varying views, the 
court drew a comparison between a discontinuance of service 
and a search. Consequently, a minimum requirement for a 
regulation of this type is that the police satisfy an impartial 
tribunal that they have "probable cause" to act, with the 
same showing as is required before a magistrate to obtain a 
search warrant. Additionally, the subscriber is to be promptly 
afforded an opportunity to challenge the allegations of the 
police and to secure restoration of service.17 
The defense of entrapment was raised unsuccessfully in 
three appellate court decisions during this past year. In 
O'Mara v. State Board of Pharmacy,tB state investigators had 
arranged with doctors for prescriptions for dangerous drugs 
in the names of fictitious patients. Apparently on the investi-
gator's request, the respondent pharmacist refilled the prescrip-
tions without the necessary doctor's authorization for a refill. 
The licensee's contention that discipline was based on a 
"trumped-up" charge was unsuccessful. 
In Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Appeals Board,t9 the filed 
charges were based on three instances which took place in 
1962, when a female employee of an on-sale licensee had 
allegedly accepted a drink, paid for by an undercover agent, 
in violation of a regulation under the Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act.20 In each instance the investigator was found 
17. The federal anti-gambling stat- 18. 246 Cal. App.2d 8, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d), follows a 862 (1966). 
different pattern. It requires prior 19. 245 Cal. App.2d 919, 54 Cal. 
notice to the subscriber before discon- Rptr. 346 (1966). 
tinuance of service. 20. Cal. Adm. Code § 143. 
324 CAL LAW 1967 
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to have initiated the incident. The appeals board held that 
public policy had been violated by the investigators' actions, 
and reversed the department's thirty-day suspension order. 
The trial court reversed the appeals board, and its decision 
was affirmed by the appellate court. The decision notes that 
enforcement policy is a matter for the agency. The entrap-
ment contention, it was found, was insufficient as a matter 
of law, for there was no tempting of innocent persons into a 
violation, and there was no showing of inducing an originally 
well-intentioned person into crime by persuasion and artifice. l 
On a contention by the licensee that the investigators should 
not have been permitted to testify as to an admission by 
the employee that she had committed similar violations in the 
past, the court, while recognizing that the criminal-law rule 
on entrapment in this state would exclude the admission of 
such evidence, held such evidence proper in this type of pro-
ceeding to show the employee's readiness to violate the law. 
In Whitlow v. Board of Medical Examiners,2 three state 
agents and two aides from the District Attorney's office posed 
as patients and obtained prescriptions for dangerous drugs. 
On several occasions, conversations in the doctor's office were 
relayed by concealed transmitters to another agent outside the 
building, stationed there for the purpose of recording the 
conversations. The agent operating the recording equipment 
was allowed to testify, over the objection of the licensee, from 
a transcript based on the recordings but containing certain 
obvious inaccuracies. The facts show that 60 percent of 
the transcript was based upon clear transmission and the 
balance upon the agent's memory, because the recording was 
partially unintelligible. The appellate court found no error, 
noting that the objection had been made to the agent's testi-
mony as a whole, rather than to those portions based on 
memory alone, and that nonlegal evidence can be received 
in an administrative proceeding, the objection going only 
~ as to the weight of the evidence. 
1. See People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 2. 248 Cal. App.2d 478, 56 Cal. 
1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959) for definition Rptr. 525 (1967). 
of entrapment. 
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The trial court sustained the agency's decision against the 
licensee and impliedly found against entrapment. The appel-
late court affirmed, finding the record insufficient to establish 
entrapment as a matter of law. Further, the court noted, 
an effective deception was practiced upon the licensee by 
reason of the fact that the so-called "patients" were enforce-
ment agents carrying recording equipment to obtain evidence 
to be used against him. But, it concluded, this deception 
was allowable; it could not be said as a matter of law that 
the licensee had been entrapped in the legal sense of the term 
by these facts. 
Were another Whitlow to arise, it is possible that recent 
decisions on search and seizure and right to privacy might 
preclude admission of the evidence obtained by the under-
cover agents. But this result seems doubtful, because business 
premises were involved. Both decoy and electronic methods 
of law enforcement have been upheld generally.3 Unless a 
distinction can be made on the grounds that the office of a 
doctor, like that of a lawyer, is semiprivate and that the nature 
of the calling requires that such privacy be ensured, it seems 
likely that the combined methods used in Whitlow will con-
tinue to be held legal. 
Hearing Procedures 
The issue was again raised this past year whether, in a 
proceeding under the California Administrative Procedure 
Act,4 a respondent is entitled at the close of the agency's 
case-in-chief to move for a dismissal on the ground that the 
facts proved do not establish a violation. In giving a negative 
answer, O'Mara v. State Board of Pharmacy5 followed earlier 
3. Analysis of criminal-law cases is 
beyond the scope of this article. But 
see generally the majority, concurring 
and dissenting opinions in Katz v United 
States, - U.S. -, 19 L. Ed.2d 576, 
88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L. Ed.2d 374, 
87 S.Ct. 408 (1966); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427, 10 L. Ed.2d 462, 
83 S. Ct. 1381 (1963); People v. Ben-
ford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959); 
326 CAL LAW 1967 
People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 264 
P.2d 521 (1953); People v. Miller, 248 
Cal. App.2d 731, 56 Cal. Rptr. 865 
(1967); People v. Ross, 236 Cal. App.2d 
364, 46 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1965); and Cal. 
Penal Code §§ 630-637.2. 
4. Cal. Government Code §§ 11500-
11528. 
5. 246 Cal. App.2d 8, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
862 (1966). 
10
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/14
Administrative Agencies 
decisions holding that, under the act, the hearing officer must 
proceed until all the evidence to be offered by all the parties 
has been received. 
The leading case of Ashbacker Radio Corporation v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission6 holds that where several 
applicants for a license have competing claims, they must 
receive equal treatment as to opportunity to be heard. Com-
monly, this requirement results in consolidation of proceed-
ings. Bostick v. Martin7 applied the Ashbacker rule where 
a new savings and loan association and an existing institution 
each applied for a permit to open an office in a geographical 
area where the commissioner would issue but one permit. 
In Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California,S 
procedural requirements were examined under the due proc-
ess standard. The proceeding concerned the discipline of 
certain students under ground rules set forth by the hearing 
committee. Included was a detailed notice of charges sent 
to each student in advance of hearing. The notice suggested 
that the student might like to retain counsel, and suggested 
methods for presenting evidence at the hearings. Goldberg 
rejected the earlier concept that a university occupies a posi-
tion of parent to child, while upholding the procedure followed 
by the committee as providing the due process safeguards 
declared necessary in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Edu-
cation.9 
Administrative Findings 
Few areas in California civil procedure have generated as 
much controversy as the requirement for findings of fact in 
civil cases. In California, findings are not required in small 
claims suits. They are not required in justice courts or in 
municipal courts where the amount in controversy is $300 or 
6. 326 U.S. 327, 90 L. Ed. 108, 66 
S. Ct. 148 (1945). 
7. 247 Cal. App.2d 179, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 322 (1966). 
8. 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
463 (1967). For further discussion, see 
Leahy, Constitutional Law, in this 
volume. 
9. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. [1961]), 
cert. denied 368 U.S. 930, 7 L. Ed.2d 
193, 82 S. Ct. 368 (1962), 
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less. 10 Proposals have been made to lessen the obligation of a 
trial judge to make findings in civil cases in superior and 
municipal courts. Conversely, efforts have been made to en-
courage more meaningful findings.ll No trend for lessening 
the findings requirement is discernible in administrative law. 
Rather, recent California legislation and decisions place em-
phasis on the findings requirements imposed upon an agency 
in a particular decision making process. 
In Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Association v. Board of 
Permit Appeals,12 the question concerned a local zoning code 
which authorized the zoning administrator to grant a variance 
if he found that certain stated standards had been met and 
if he made findings of fact establishing compliance with the 
standards. If the administrator denied the variance appli-
cation, a review board was authorized to change the admin-
istrator's ruling but was required to specify errors and to 
make findings of the facts relied on. In this case the admin-
istrator denied the variance application, and the review board 
overruled him. In mandamus, the trial court and the court 
of appeal denied a writ. The supreme court reversed. The 
majority noted the requirement of the code for "specific find-
ings" by the review board. The decision reviewed the find-
ings made by the review board and found them inadequate 
to sustain its action. It also reviewed the record, and by 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the review board, 
found the findings of fact which would support it were likewise 
inadequate. The requirement of the code for specific findings 
by the review board was a distinguishing feature. The case 
states that the rule providing that presumptions that an 
agency's ruling rest upon necessary findings, and that such 
findings are supported by substantial evidence, does not apply 
to agencies which must state their findings and set forth the 
relevant supportive facts. 
10. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 117h, 
117j, 632. 
11. See Twentieth Biennial Report, 
Cal. Judicial Council 18 (1965); Senate 
Bill 483 (1965); 1959 amendments to 
328 CAL LAW 1967 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 632, 634 (Cal. 
11 Stats 1959, c. 637). 
12. 66 Cal.2d 767, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146, 
427 P.2d 810 (1967). 
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Similarly, in Greyhound Lines v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion/3 the Supreme Court annulled an agency order for in-
sufficient findings. In 1961, section 1705 of the Public Utili-
ties Code was amended. The amendment requires the Public 
Utilities Commission to set forth in its decisions, separately 
stated, findings of fact and conclusions of law on material 
issues.14 In September 1964, the commission on its own 
motion instituted an investigation into Greyhounds' commuter 
service in the San Francisco area. Following hearings, the 
commission issued an order directing the carrier to establish 
peak-hour commuter service on two routes. The only sepa-
rately stated finding appearing in the decision was that "public 
interest requires the establishment" of the service but that 
"[the] [s]afety of operations will not permit the inauguration 
[of portions thereof] until adequate turnouts for bus stops 
are constructed by the responsible public authorities. ,,16 This 
finding was held inadequate to meet the requirement of section 
1705, for it did not contain findings of the basic facts upon 
which the ultimate finding of "public interest" or "public 
convenience and necessity" was based. Repeating reasoning 
stated in an earlier decision,16 the court observed that findings 
of basic facts afford a rational basis for judicial review, assist 
the reviewing court to ascertain the principles relied upon by 
the agency and to determine whether it acted arbitrarily, 
and also assist parties to know why the case was lost and 
to prepare for rehearing or review and assist others who may 
be planning activities involving similar questions. 
The facts in the case disclose that there were several mate-
rial issues on which evidence was introduced. The carrier 
questioned the jurisdiction of the commission based upon 
the contention that the new routes were beyond its dedication 
13. 65 Ca!.2d 811, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
484, 423 P.2d 556 (1967). 
14. Cal. Pub. Uti!. Code § 1705 in 
pertinent parts provides: "[T]he com-
mission shall make and file its order, 
containing its decision. The decision 
shall contain, separately stated, find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law by 
the commission on all issues material 
to the order or decision." 
15. 65 Cal.2d at 813, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
at 485, 423 P.2d at 557. 
16. California Motor Transport Co. 
v Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Cal.2d 
270, 28 Cal. Rptr. 868, 379 P.2d 324 
(1963). 
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of property to public use, and raised the question whether 
the new routes would support themselves. 
Other statutes similar to section 1705 of the Public Utili-
ties Code have also been interpreted to require findings of 
the basic facts upon which the ultimate decision is made. 
The federal case of Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics 
Board17 concerned a review of a Civil Aeronautics Board 
decision based on Federal Aviation Act section 1005 (f) /8 
which is similar to California Public Utilities Code section 
1705. The board had held extensive hearings to determine 
which carrier should operate new or improved routes in the 
southern parts of the United States. The board's findings 
recognized one carrier's need for route support but found in 
terms of quality of service offered by either carrier that neither 
could offer significant advantage in providing the new service. 
The court held that the findings fell short of the requirement 
that the board's decision must be supported in a manner to 
enable the court to review the correctness of the conclusion 
reached on the basis of the findings. 
In Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications 
Commission,19 the court stated the purposes of detailed find-
ings of fact in reasoning similar to that of the California 
Supreme Court in the California Motor Transport Co.20 case. 
The question comes to mind, what are "material issues" 
in an agency proceeding where the pertinent law provides 
only broad standards? In the California Motor Transport 
Co. case the court declared that it was within the discretion of 
the agency to determine the factors material to the ultimate 
decision. 1 But obviously no rule can be stated that will apply 
in every case, for much will depend upon the relevant con-
tentions of the parties and the nature of the ultimate issue. 
17. 306 F.2d 739, 113 App. D.C. 
132 (D.C. Cir. [1962]). 
18. 49 U.S.C. § 1485(f). 
19. 96 F.2d 554, 68 App. D.C. 282 
(D.C. Cir. [1938]). 
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v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Cal.2d 
270, 28 Cal. Rptr. 868, 379 P.2d 324 
(1963). 
1. 59 Cal.2d at 275, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 
870, 379 P.2d at 326. 
14
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/14
Administrative Agencies 
Further reflecting the need for findings even where the 
agency's action is quasi-legislative, Bostick v. Martin2 held 
erroneous a decision of a department head denying an appli-
cation for a permit for a new savings and loan association 
because the denial did not contain sufficient findings of fact. 
Even though no detailed requirement for findings was made 
by the pertinent statute, which merely used the word "finds" 
in stating the official's authority, a detailed finding was re-
quired. 
Despite the emphasis that the cases under review place 
on basic findings, it is to be noted that many agency matters 
involve adjudicative proceedings where the fact issues are 
narrow or fairly routine. Undoubtedly, a case can be made 
for more informative or specific findings in such adjudicative 
matters. But they are of substantial volume; for the present 
at least, the California Administrative Procedure Act permits 
findings to be made in the language of the pleadings or by 
reference thereto. 3 Likewise, the rule has been frequently 
stated in California cases that detailed and specific findings 
are not required in a proceeding before an administrative 
body unless the statute authorizing the proceeding requires 
them.4 In quasi-legislative proceedings of a local commission 
composed of laymen, findings may be informal and the stand-
ards of judicial findings need not be met.6 
Agency Decisions and the Courts 
General principles of judicial review following final agency 
action, at state or local level, are now well established in 
California. During the past year, one substantial statutory 
2. 247 Cal. App.2d 179, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 322 (1966). 
3. Cal. Government Code § 11518. 
4. See Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Appeals Board, 52 Cal.2d 259, 
341 P.2d 291 (1959); California Ship-
building Corp. v. Industrial Accident 
Comm'n, 31 Cal.2d 270, 188 P.2d 27 
(1947); Webster v. Board of Dental Ex-
aminers, 17 Cal.2d 534, 110 P.2d 992 
(1941); Embey Foods, Inc. v. Paul, 230 
Cal. App.2d 687, 41 Cal. Rptr. 365 
(1964); Palm Springs Turf Club. v. Cal. 
Horse Racing Board, 155 Cal. App.2d 
242, 317 P.2d 713 (1957). But see 
County of Amador v. State Board of 
Equalization, 240 Cal. App.2d 205, 49 
Cal. Rptr. 448 (1966). 
5. E.g., County of Santa Barbara v. 
Purcell, Inc. 251 Cal. App.2d 169, 59 
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1967). 
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change was made. Judicial review functions in alcoholic 
beverage control cases were transferred to the supreme court 
and courts of appeal, divesting jurisdiction from the superior 
courts.6 
In the broad spectrum of the relationship between agencies 
and the courts, one of the most important questions confront-
ing the courts and practitioners is the "exhaustion of remedy" 
rule. In particular applications, cases decided during the past 
year were divided in result; some applied the rule and others 
did not. Although the issues were not framed in terms of 
exhaustion, California Water and Telephone Co. v. County 
of Los Angeles7 involved the same general criteria. Several 
utilities and a nonprofit association to which members of the 
industry belonged brought a representative suit for declara-
tory relief and sought to enjoin enforcement of a county 
ordinance. The court set aside the ordinance on the ground 
that it was unconstitutional and noted the interest of the 
public and the importance of the question. The ordinance 
in question, requiring administrative action, was alleged to 
conflict with state law, and the court so held after first con-
sidering whether the suit should be entertained. However, in 
Robins v. County of Los Angeles,S a suit was brought to 
enjoin enforcement of a county ordinance requiring the licens-
ing of a place of business employing "topless" waitresses. 
The court held the suit to be premature, noting that the 
plaintiff had not made application for a license and therefore 
had not made available to himself the remedies against denial 
of a license that are provided by the ordinance. 
In Rosenfield v. Malcolm,9 the Supreme Court rejected a 
contention that a dismissed employee seeking reinstatement 
had overlooked his administrative remedy. The alleged rem-
edy was provided by two county charter sections, both of 
which were stated in general terms and contained no specifics 
6. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 23090-
23090.7. 
7. 253 Cal. App.2d 11, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
618 (1967). 
8. 248 Cal. App.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
853 (1966). For further discussion of 
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this case see McKinstry, State and Local 
Government, in this volume. 
9. 65 Cal.2d 559, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 
421 P.2d 647 (1967). For further dis-
cussion see Leahy, Constitutional Law, 
in this volume. 
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for an administrative remedy. The rule was stated in the 
following terms: 
[M]ere possession by some official body of a continu-
ing supervisory or investigatory power does not itself 
suffice to afford an 'administrative remedy' unless the 
statute or regulation under which the power is exercised 
establishes clearly defined machinery for the submission, 
evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved 
parties.10 
The exhaustion rule was also held inapplicable in Gaumer 
v. County of Tehama/1 where a suit was brought for a refund 
of real property taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed. 
The administrative remedy available to the taxpayer was an 
appeal to the board of supervisors, but by the time the tax-
payer had received his tax bill, the prescribed period in which 
the board sat had expired. The contention that the taxpayer 
should have requested the board to sit in special session was 
rejected. This case seems to stand on its own facts. Other 
tax situations, where there is readily available a source of 
administrative relief, will require the taxpayer to seek first 
a decision from that body. 
The decision in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Coud2 
applied the exhaustion rule to bar a civil suit by an ex-police-
man for reinstatement and back pay, holding that certain city 
charter provisions, not entirely explicit in the facts, provided 
an administrative remedy. Procedurally, the case is of inter-
est. The trial court had taken the view that the exhaustion 
rule did not apply and had denied defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. In granting a writ of prohibition against 
further proceedings below, the court of appeal held that the 
exhaustion rule affected the jurisdiction of the courts. The 
incorrect trial court determination therefore could be cor-
rected by writ. 
California permits a declaratory judgment suit to test the 
10. 65 Cal.2d at 566, 55 Cal. Rptr. 12. 246 Cal. App.2d 73, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
at 511, 421 P.2d at 703. 442 (1966). 
11. 247 Cal. App.2d 548, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 777 (1967). 
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validity of a state administrative regulation, when the suit 
is filed before a criminal or disciplinary proceeding has 
commenced. By use of this procedure, a licensee often may 
obtain a court ruling on a questioned administrative ruling, 
without undergoing the expense and risk of agency enforce-
ment action. During the past year an interesting variation 
of this technique appeared in two cases testing the validity 
of recent licensing statutes relating to the ownership of phar-
macies by licensed physicians. The two cases, Magan Med-
ical Clinic v. State Board of Medical Examineri3 and Warrack 
Medical Center Hospital v. State Board of Pharmacy,14 arose 
on substantially undisputed facts. These involved differing 
fact situations, so the court would be in a position to inter-
pret the statute definitively. In form, Magan was a declara-
tory relief suit; Warrack was a mandamus action to compel 
issuance of a pharmacy license after denial by the agency 
in reliance on the questioned statute. 
In the day-to-day operation of most arms of government, 
there persists the continuing problem of delegation of power. 
Of importance this past year in this regard is the supreme 
court decision in Wilke and Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department 
of Alcoholic Beverage Control/5 in which a divided court 
again upheld California's fair trade laws in the marketing of 
alcoholic beverages. The majority opinion concluded that 
there was no delegation to private persons of the power to 
fix prices, to regulate the business of competitors, or to exclude 
a potential competitor. The court also found that there was 
no unlawful delegation in the prescribed administrative and 
criminal sanctions for violation, because the legislature had 
prescribed sufficient guidelines. The issues as decided in 
Wilke reflect the traditional test for an improper delegation 
of power, and it seems clear at this time that any legislative 
delegation will be difficult to contest so long as there appears 
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 124, 57 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1967). For further discus-
Rptr. 256 (1967). For further dis- sion see Brandel, Business Associations, 
cussion see Brandel, Business Associa- in this volume. 
tions, in this volume. 15. 65 Cal. 2d 349, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 
14. 249 Cal. App.2d 118, 57 Cal. 420 P.2d 735 (1966). 
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on the face of the statute a substantial attempt to provide 
statutory guidelines. 
The regard of the courts for state regulatory policy and for 
agency functions is shown by the recent decision of the 
supreme court in Keller v. Thornton Canning Company.16 
Keller involved the application of Public Utilities Code section 
3571 in its relation to the Highway Carriers Act.17 The 
court held that failure of a carrier to obtain the required 
permit from the Public Utilities Commission was not a bar 
to a civil suit to recover alleged undercharges to shippers, 
filed at the direction of the commission. The carrier had been 
instructed by a commission staff directive to review its rec-
ords and collect undercharges from its shippers. Pursuant to 
the directive, the carrier brought a civil action. The shippers 
interposed the defense that plaintiff was barred from recover-
ing the minimum rate because the carrier had not had the 
appropriate permit from the Commission at the time the serv-
ice was rendered. The trial court held for defendants. The 
supreme court reversed, applying the principles stated by 
Chief Justice Traynor in an earlier case. IS The Highway 
Carriers Act contains no express provision barring a non-
licensed person from civil recovery. The court noted that 
the paramount purpose of the statute violated is to protect 
the public against ruinous carrier competition and possible 
attendant evils. It concluded that the more important objec-
tive of protecting the minimum rate structure, as enforced 
by the commission, should prevail over that of penalizing 
the unlicensed carrier by foreclosure of access to the courts. 
An earlier decision of a court of appeal denying recovery was 
distinguished on the ground that an unexecuted contract call-
16. 66 Cal. 2d 963, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
836, 429 P.2d 156 (1967). 
17. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 3571 pro-
vides: "No highway contract carrier 
or radial highway common carrier shall 
engage in the business of transportation 
of property for compensation by motor 
vehicle on any public highway in this 
State without first having obtained from 
the commission a permit authorizing 
such operation." 
18. Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball 
Sons, 48 Ca1.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 
(1957), involving statutory provisions, 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031, which 
declare expressly, in the case of a con-
tractor, that no action may be brought 
or maintained in a court of this state 
by the unlicensed contractor. 
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ing for illegal rates had been involved.19 The court of another 
state in Johnston v. L. B. Hartz Stores, Inc. 20 already clearly 
had established support for the commission's enforcement 
directive and its underlying policy considerations, stating: 
[P]ressure of the shippers upon the carriers for reduced 
rates in violation of the statute will almost entirely be 
relieved if the shippers know that notwithstanding any 
illegal bargain that is made, recovery may still be had 
on the basis of the minimum rate fixed by the commis-
sion.1 
Another civil suit brought by a carrier against a shipper 
to recover undercharges was considered by an appellate court 
last year. In Pellandini v. Pacific Limestone Products, Inc} 
the court of appeal, reversing the trial court, held in effect 
that the administrative determination that the rates in ques-
tion were less than minimum was res judicata. The court 
noted that while the shipper was not a party to the admin-
istrative proceeding, he had standing to intervene or to move 
to rescind, modify, or annul the commission's decision.3 
19. Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Cal. 2. 245 Cal. App.2d 774,54 Cal. Rptr. 
App.2d 382, 205 P.2d 67 (1949). 290 (1966). 
20. 202 Minn. 132, 277 N.W. 414 3. 245 Cal. App. at 777-78, 54 Cal. 
(1938). Rptr. at 291-292 (1967). 
1. 202 Minn. at 135, 277 N.W. at 
416. 
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